

## Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION ARA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 FEA-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00

SSO-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 ACDA-05 AGR-05 AID-05 CEA-01

CEQ-01 CIEP-01 OFA-01 DLOS-04 DOTE-00 EB-07 EPA-01

ERDA-05 FMC-01 TRSE-00 H-02 INR-07 INT-05 IO-10

JUSE-00 L-03 NSC-05 NSF-01 OES-03 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-04

PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 /109 W

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O 150313Z AUG 75

FM AMEMBASSY NASSAU

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7089

INFO COCG WASHDC IMMEDIATE

COCG SEVEN MIAMI IMMEDIATE

USDOC WASHDC IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 NASSAU 1339

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROGERS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: EFIS BF

SUBJ: SPINY LOBSTER TALKS

REF: NASSAU 1338

1. BASED ON DAVID WALLACE'S TWO DISCUSSIONS TODAY WITH ADDERLEY WHICH LED TO THE CONCLUSION THAT ADDERLEY HAD EFFECTIVELY TERMINATED THE NEGOTIATIONS ON SPINY LOBSTER (NASSAU 1338), IT WAS AGREED THAT I SHOULD AT ONCE ATTEMPT TO SECURE A MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER.

2. THE PRIME MINISTER AGREED TO RECEIVE ME IN HIS RESIDENCE. I APOLOGIZED FOR THE IMPOSITION ON THE PM'S PRIVACY BUT STATED THAT I WOULD NOT HAVE TAKEN THE LIBERTY TO DO SO WERE IT NOT  
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FOR MY BELIEF THAT THE ISSUE WARRANTED HIS IMMEDIATE PERSONAL

ATTENTION. SEATED IN A SPORT SHIRT, SLACKS AND HOUSE SLIPPERS, HE WAS VERY GRACIOUS AND RELAXED.

3. I THEN PROCEEDED TO DESCRIBE WALLACE'S CONVERSATION WITH ADDERLEY WITH OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT ADDERLEY HAD CONCLUDED THE DISCUSSIONS SHOULD BE TERMINATED SINCE THERE WAS NO BASIS FOR REACHING AGREEMENT. ADDERLEY HAD PROPOSED THAT AN ANNOUNCEMENT BE MADE ON MONDAY TO THE FOREGOING EFFECT (ALTHOUGH HE HAD SUBSEQUENTLY AGREED TO A PRO FORMA CONTINUATION UNTIL WED.). THE PM, WHILE DEMONSTRATING SOME UNCERTAINTY ON THE DETAILS OF TERMINATING, AGREED THAT ADDERLEY HAD ACCURATELY DESCRIBED GCOB POSITION.

4. I SAID THAT, SUCH BEING THE CASE, WE WERE FACED WITH A VERY SERIOUS PROBLEM. I WAS CERTAIN THAT I WOULD BE RECALLED TO WASHINGTON AT ONCE FOR CONSULTATION. THE FIRST QUESTION THAT WOULD BE PUT TO ME WOULD BE WHAT PRECISELY WAS THE EXPLANATION FOR THE GCOB POSITION. I SAID THAT I COULD NOT SATISFACTORILY ANSWER THAT QUESTION. ALL I COULD RESPOND WAS THAT MR. ADDERLEY HAD INDICATED THAT "THE BASIS OF OUR PROPOSAL WAS TOO NARROW" BUT HAD NOT ELABORATED. I WONDERED WHETHER THE PM WOULD HELP TO ENLIGHTEN ME.

5. THE PM RECOUNTED THAT HE AND ADDERLEY HAD CONSIDERED THE MATERIAL WHICH HAD BEEN PRESENTED DURING THE LAST TWO DAYS. THEY BOTH AGREED THAT IT WAS A VERY DISAPPOINTING PROPOSAL THAT BORE NO PROMISE WHATSOEVER OF OUR EVENTUALLY REACHING AN AGREEMENT.

6. I SAID THAT THE DIFFICULTY WITH THAT EXPLANATION WAS THAT IT REALLY DID NOT CLARIFY IN WHAT WAY THEY WERE DISAPPOINTED OR WHAT THEY MEANT BY STATING THAT THE BASIS OF OUR PROPOSAL WAS TOO NARROW TO HOLD ANY HOPE OF AGREEMENT. WE COULD NOT EVEN TELL WHETHER THE SPECIFICS THAT WE HAD ADVANCED WERE IN THEIR VIEW INADEQUATE OR WHETHER THERE WAS AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT APPROACH THAT THEY HAD IN MIND. COULD THEY NOT MAKE A COUNTER PROPOSAL.

7. THE PM CONCEDED THAT I HAD MADE A REASONABLE POINT. HE NEVERTHELESS APPEARED RELUCTANT TO HAVE THE GOVERNMENT ADVANCE  
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A DETAILED ALTERNATIVE. I SAID THAT WHILE IT WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE MOST HELPFUL IF THE GOVERNMENT WOULD ADVANCE A DETAILED ALTERNATIVE EVEN SHORT OF THAT AN INDICATION OF THE GENERAL DIRECTION OF GCOB CONCERNS AND INTEREST WOULD BE VALUABLE.

8. PINDLING SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS MR. WALLACE COULD PUT THE SUGGESTION FOR A COUNTER-PROPOSAL TO MR. ADDERLEY. I SAID THAT I WAS SURE THAT MR. WALLACE WOULD BE WILLING TO DO SO BUT THAT

BASED ON THE ADDERLEY/WALLACE DISCUSSIONS OF TODAY, IT WAS NOT CLEAR THAT MR. ADDERLEY WAS PREPARED TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO SUCH AN APPROACH. COULD I NOW ASSUME THAT HE WOULD?

9. THE PRIME MINISTER DID NOT RESPOND DIRECTLY. HE SAID THAT IN A SENSE THIS CHANGED THE GROUND RULES -- THAT IS THAT WE WERE NOW ASKING THEM TO ADVANCE A PROPOSAL. I SAID THAT I DID NOT BELIEVE WE WERE CHANGING THE GROUND RULES AT ALL IN THAT WE WERE ONLY ASKING THEM TO RESPOND TO OUR PROPOSAL. PINDLING WONDERED WHETHER WE COULD NOT COME UP WITH SOMETHING MORE. I SAID THAT I WOULD NOT KNOW WHERE TO START SINCE AT THIS POINT WE HAD BEEN TOLD THAT WHAT WE HAD PROPOSED WAS TOTALLY IRRELEVANT BUT HAD BEEN GIVEN NOT THE SLIGHTEST INDICATION OF WHAT GCOB MIGHT CONSIDER RELEVANT.

10. I ASKED PM IF HE COULD ELABORATE ON WHAT HE MEANT IN SAYING THAT THE GCOB HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTED BY OUR PROPOSAL. FOR THE FIRST TIME, PINDLING THEN GAVE ME AN INSIGHT INTO THEIR THINKING. HE SAID THAT THE WAY THE GCOB APPROACHED THE ENTIRE MATTER WAS THAT THE CONTINENTAL SHELF LOBSTER WAS THEIR RESOURCE AND THEIRS ALONE. MOREOVER, THE GCOB INTENDED TO FULLY EXPLOIT THAT RESOURCE EVENTUALLY WITHOUT OUTSIDE INVOLVEMENT. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT FOR MY PERSONAL INFORMATION, GCOB HAD BEEN WORKING WITH THE UNDP IN DRAWING UP A PROGRAM FOR EXPLOITING THE LOBSTER. THIS WOULD INVOLVE A FISH PROCESSING PLANT AT POTTERS CAY, ANOTHER PLANT IN THE NORTHERN PART OF THE ISLANDS, ANOTHER IN THE SOUTHERN PART AND OTHER APPROPRIATE INFRASTRUCTURES. IT WOULD REQUIRE 300 BAHAMIAN FISHING BOATS. THE UNDP HAD ADVISED THE GCOB THAT THEY COULD ACCOMPLISH ALL OF THE FOREGOING BY THE END OF 1977. PM ADDED IT WAS THEIR FIRM INTENTION TO DO SO. IT WAS AGAINST THIS FRAME OF REFERENCE THAT THEY HAD BEEN PREPARED TO ENTERTAIN A U.S. PROPOSAL "CONSISTENT WITH COMITY OF NATIONS" TO SEE IF THEY COULD MAKE  
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SOME TEMPORARY AND LIMITED ACCOMMODATIONS TO ASSIST THE U.S. WITH ITS PROBLEM. INSTEAD, HOWEVER, AS THEY READ OUR PROPOSAL WE APPEARED TO BE FOCUSING ON. (A) A RATHER LONG TERM APPROACH AND (B) ONE WHICH HAD ITS POINT OF DEPARTURE THE ASSUMPTION OF A COMMON RESOURCE AND A COMMON PROBLEM.

11. PINDLING SAID THAT IN REVIEWING OUR PROPOSAL THEY WERE STRUCK BY THE FACT THAT THERE COULD BE NO REALISTIC RECIPROCITY. THE FLORIDA RESOURCE WAS BEING FISHED AT MAXIMUM CAPACITY IF NOT BEING OVER-FISHED. THEREFORE, WHAT WE HAD IN MIND WAS SENDING OUR PEOPLE OVER TO FISH THE BAHAMIAN RESOURCES WHICH, AS HE HAD INDICATED, THEY VIEWED AS ENTIRELY THEIRS. CONVERSELY WE COULD NOT, FROM A PRACTICAL POINT OF VIEW, OFFER RECIPROCITY.

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 FEA-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00

SSO-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 ACDA-05 AGR-05 AID-05 CEA-01

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JUSE-00 L-03 NSC-05 NSF-01 OES-03 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-04

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O 150313Z AUG 75

FM AMEMBASSY NASSAU

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7090

INFO COCG WASHDC IMMEDIATE

COCG SEVEN MIAMI IMMEDIATE

USDOC WASHDC IMMEDIATE

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12. I SAID THAT AS HE UNDOUBTEDLY APPRECIATED, THERE WERE TWO APPROACHES THAT COULD BE TAKEN TO THE QUESTION OF RECIPROCITY. THE FIRST WOULD BE TO DEFINE IT IN A LITERAL SENSE AS REQUIRING KIND FOR KIND EQUALLY. THIS WE CLEARLY ACKNOWLEDGED WAS IMPOSSIBLE IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. IN THE FIRST PLACE, THE BAHAMIANS DID NOT HAVE ANYTHING LIKE THE SAME NUMBER OF BOATS WE HAD BUT EVEN IF THEY DID, IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE FLORIDA RESOURCE COULD NOT PROVIDE ADEQUATE LOBSTERS. HOWEVER, THERE WAS A SECOND APPROACH THAT ONE COULD TAKE TO RECIPROCITY. THIS WOULD REQUIRE OFF-SETTING COMPENSATIONS. IF THE U.S. COULD NOT OFFER TO PROVIDE AS MANY LOBSTERS TO THE BAHAMAS FROM THE FLORIDA RESOURCE, WE CERTAINLY COULD PROVIDE OTHER KINDS OF INDUCEMENTS WHICH COULD BE GENUINELY PORTRAYED AS PROVIDING FOR A FULLY RECIPROCAL AND EQUITABLE ARRANGEMENT. WE HAD THIS VERY MUCH IN MIND AND I WAS CONFIDENT THAT MR. WALLACE WAS PREPARED TO EXAMINE SUCH COMPENSATORY ARRANGEMENTS. THE QUESTION WAS WHETHER THE GCOB AGREED THAT THIS WAS AT LEAST  
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IN THEORY AN AVENUE FOR MEETING THE RECIPROCITY PROBLEM.

13. PM POINTED OUT THAT THEIR LAW REQUIRED NOT SIMPLY RECIPROCITY BUT THAT THEY COULD ONLY ENTER INTO ARRANGEMENTS WHICH COULD BE DEMONSTRATED TO BE IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST. EVEN IF THE LAW DID NOT REQUIRE THAT, HE WOULD OBVIOUSLY FEEL RESPONSIBLE FOR ASSURING THAT ANY AGREEMENT CLEARLY WAS IN THEIR NATIONAL INTEREST. AND FINALLY, EVEN IF HE WERE NOT SO INCLINED, AS A PRACTICAL MATTER OF DOMESTIC POLITICS, HE COULD NOT CONCEIVABLY DEFEND TO THE PARLIAMENT AND TO HIS POPULATION AN AGREEMENT WHICH WAS NOT MANIFESTLY IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST. I AGREED THAT THIS WAS UNDOUBTEDLY SO BUT WAS THAT NOT WHAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WAS MEANT TO DETERMINE, THAT IS WHETHER WE COULD WORK OUT AN AGREEMENT WHICH WAS IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST?

14. THE PM ALSO STATED THAT HE "HAD A TOUGH ENOUGH TIME AS IT WAS" TO CONVINCE HIS PEOPLE THAT FOR THE COUNTRY TO SUCCEED THEY WERE GOING TO HAVE TO BE WILLING TO WORK HARD. HE SAID HE HAD POINTED OUT THAT EVEN GOLD REQUIRED HARD DIGGING. BAHAMIANS FOUND IT EASY TO FIND EXCUSES NOT TO ENTER INTO THE FISHING BUSINESS. HE THOUGHT HE HAD BEGUN TO DEVELOP A GENUINE INTEREST AND MOMENTUM ON THEIR PART TO DEVELOP A FISHING CAPABILITY. HE DID NOT WISH TO DO ANYTHING WHICH WOULD ENDANGER THAT EFFORT.

15. MOREOVER, THE PM SAID THAT HE WAS CONVINCED THAT THE U.S. FISHERMEN HAD OVERFISHED THE FLORIDA RESOURCE. HE WOULD NOT PERMIT THAT TO HAPPEN TO THE BAHAMAS RESOURCE.

16. I SAID THAT I COULD UNDERSTAND HIS VARIOUS POINTS AND THAT THEY ALL HAD A SUBSTANTIAL DEGREE OF VALIDITY. WHAT I DID NOT AGREE WITH WAS THAT THEY NECESSARILY WERE IN CONFLICT WITH OUR CONCLUDING AN AGREEMENT TO PERMIT FLORIDA FISHERMEN TO HAVE SOME ACCESS TO THE BAHAMA BANKS. WHILE WE CERTAINLY HAD HOPES THAT WE COULD WORK OUT A LONG TERM AGREEMENT IF THEY WERE INSISTENT ON ONLY CONSIDERING A SHORT TERM ARRANGEMENT, THAT WAS AT LEAST A POINT OF DEPARTURE THAT WE COULD RESPOND TO. I SAID THE SAME WAS TRUE FOR HIS OTHER POINTS.

17. OBVIOUSLY, I COULD NOT ASSURE HIM THAT IF THE GCOB ADVANCED  
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A RESPONSE TO OUR PROPOSAL CONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLES HE HAD ENUNCIATED THAT THE SPECIFICS OF SUCH A PROPOSAL WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO US. I SAID WE HAD OUR OWN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC

PROBLEMS AND NATIONAL INTERESTS. BUT WE HAD NO BASIS AS YET FOR DETERMINING THE ACCEPTABILITY OF A GCOB PROPOSAL SINCE THE GCOB HAD NOT ADVANCED ONE.

18. I THEN DREW A HYPOTHETICAL PROPOSAL. I SAID SUPPOSE WE STARTED WITH A CATEGORICAL ASSURANCE THAT WE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE LOBSTER RESOURCE ON THE BANKS WERE CLEARLY BAHAMIAN. SECOND, THAT WE UNDERSTOOD THE BAHAMAS INTENDED TO EXPLOIT THAT RESOURCE WITH ITS OWN CAPABILITIES. THIRD, THAT IT INTENDED TO PROTECT THE LONG TERM VIABILITY OF THAT RESOURCE. FOURTH, THAT THE VIABILITY TRANSLATED INTO 350 BOATS FISHING ON THE BANKS. FIFTH, THAT THE BAHAMAS INTENDED TO HAVE 350 BOATS IN THREE YEARS. SIXTH, THAT BETWEEN NOW AND THE END OF THE THIRD YEAR THERE WOULD BE ROOM FOR FLORIDA BASED FISHERMEN ONLY UP TO THE EXTENT THERE WERE NOT BAHAMIAN BOATS EQUAL TO 350. SEVENTH THAT AS THE NUMBERS OF BAHAMIAN BOATS INCREASED, THE NUMBER OF U.S. BOATS WOULD BE DECREASED. EIGHTH AND FINALLY, SUPPOSE FURTHER THAT WE COULD WORK OUT ARRANGEMENTS ACCEPTABLE TO THE BAHAMAS FOR ESTABLISHING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THOSE AMERICAN BOATS OVER THAT THREE YEAR PERIOD WOULD BE PERMITTED TO FISH. IF ALL OF THESE CONDITIONS WERE ESTABLISHED, WOULD THE PM CONSIDER THAT TO BE CONSISTENT WITH BAHAMIAN NATIONAL INTEREST, ITS FISHING LAW, AND THE REALITIES OF THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION? PINDLING REPLIED THAT SOMETHING ALONG THAT LINE SEEMED REASONABLE. I SAID THAT WHILE I DID NOT HAVE THE SLIGHTEST IDEA AS TO WHETHER, WHEN REDUCED TO SPECIFICS, THIS WOULD SATISFACTORILY MEET U.S. NEEDS, IT DEMONSTRATED THAT THERE WAS FURTHER ROOM FOR EXCHANGING VIEWS. WHILE IN DUE COURSE WE MIGHT FIND OUR VIEWS WERE SO FAR APART ON THE PARTICULARS THAT WE COULD NOT CONCLUDE AN AGREEMENT, SURELY WE HAD NO BASIS FOR REACHING SUCH A PESSIMISTIC CONCLUSION AS YET.

19. THIS CONVERSATION WHICH HAD OCCUPIED ABOUT AN HOUR AND A HALF TERMINATED ON THIS NOTE WITH THE AGREEMENT THAT MR. ADDERLEY AND MR. WALLACE WOULD RE-ADDRESS THE SUBJECT ON MONDAY WITH OUR SIDE PROPOSING THAT THE GCOB OFFER A COUNTER-PROPOSAL OR AT LEAST A CLEARER INSIGHT INTO THEIR THINKING.

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WPM COMMENT: I HAVE SET FORTH MY DISCUSSION WITH THE PM AT CONSIDERABLE LENGTH BECAUSE I BELIEVE IT PROVIDES AS MUCH OF AN INSIGHT INTO THEIR THINKING ON THE LOBSTER ISSUE AS WE ARE EVER GOING TO GET. VIEWED FROM THEIR VANTAGE POINT, THEY SEE THE LOBSTER AS A PRECIOUS RESOURCE WHICH, AS A COUNTRY LARGELY DEVOID OF RESOURCES, THEY WISH TO TOTALLY EXPLOIT FOR THEMSELVES. PINDLING HAS BEEN CONSISTENT IN PRESSING THE BAHAMIAN PEOPLE TO RELY LESS ON TOURISM AND DIVERSIFY INTO AGRICULTURE AND FISHING. HE KNOWS HE HAS A TOUGH ROW TO HOE. HE PUBLICLY

CASTIGATES BAHAMIANS FOR BEING UNWILLING TO WORK HARD AND TO TAKE JOBS WHICH IN THIS SOCIETY TEND TO BE VIEWED AS MENIAL AND BENEATH THE STATUS OF BAHAMIANS. MY OWN JUDGMENT IS THAT HE MAY WELL NOT SUCCEED IN ACHIEVING A SUBSTANTIAL DIVERSIFICATION INTO AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES DESPITE HIS BEST EFFORTS. BUT, EVEN IF HE IS SUCCESSFUL, HIS TIME-FRAME IS TOTALLY UNREALISTIC. THE WAY THIS SOCIETY MOVES, I CANNOT IMAGINE THE BAHAMIANS HAVING 300 BOATS PLUS AN ON-SHORE FISHING INFRASTRUCTURE BY THE END OF 1977. BUT PINDLING WILL BE RUNNING FOR ELECTION BETWEEN NOW AND 1977 AND HE IS OBVIOUSLY GOING TO GIVE IT A COLLEGE TRY.

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FM AMEMBASSY NASSAU

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7091

INFO COCG WASHDC IMMEDIATE

COCG SEVEN MIAMI IMMEDIATE

USDOC WASHDC IMMEDIATE

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21. WHAT THIS MEANS FOR THE U.S. FLORIDA LOBSTER FISHING INDUSTRY IN THE BAHAMAS IS THAT IF WE ACCEPT THE GCOB FRAME OF REFERENCE AND PROVIDING THAT THE DETAILS OF THE CONDITIONS WHICH THEY ESTABLISH ARE ACCEPTABLE TO US, WE CAN GET A PIECE OF THE ACTION FOR THE SHORT RUN. AND INDEED THAT SHORT RUN COULD WELL TURN OUT TO BE SUBSTANTIALLY LONGER THAN THROUGH

1977 IF MY GUESS ABOUT LIMITATIONS ON BAHAMIAN CAPABILITIES TO IMPLEMENT THEIR PROGRAMS IS CORRECT. IF, HOWEVER, WE SEEM TO THEM TO BE TALKING ABOUT A LONG TERM ARRANGEMENT AND ABOUT A COMMON RESOURCE, NO MATTER HOW HIGHLY MOTIVATED OUR BASIC PURPOSE MAY BE, THE BAHAMIANS WILL SIMPLY TURN US OFF. EVEN THOUGH THE LEADERSHIP MAY BE INTELLECTUALLY AWARE OF THE FACT THAT A FAILURE TO REACH AN ACCOMMODATION ON THE LOBSTER ISSUE COULD HAVE VERY SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES OF A BROADER NATURE FOR OUR RELATIONS, I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THEY CAN QUITE BRING THEMSELVES TO COMPREHEND HOW SERIOUS THESE CONSEQUENCES COULD BE. THAT WAS CLEAR FROM COMMENTS MADE BY ADDERLEY TO ME. THUS,  
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THEY ARE QUITE CAPABLE OF TERMINATING THE NEGOTIATIONS EVEN IN THE FACE OF SUCH CONSEQUENCES.

22. MR. WALLACE AND HIS DELEGATION ARE WORKING THROUGH THE WEEKEND TO PREPARE FOR THE MONDAY SESSIONS AND WILL DOUBTLESS BE ADVANCING THEIR SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS ON WHERE WE GO FROM HERE. AT LEAST FOR THE MOMENT, HOWEVER, WE HAVE TURNED THE NEGOTIATIONS BACK ON.  
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## Message Attributes

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